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The paper discusses civilian control of the military. The aims of such control include disabling
competition between armed forces and democratically elected government. Civilian control of the
military is characterised by a degree of disharmony and tension, in even the best of circumstances,
in democratic nations. Democratic control of the armed forces provides legitimacy to the military,
and when it works well, credibility. At the highest level of the democratic control of the armed forces
should be parliaments with their oversight responsibility. Understanding of what it is that civilians
are to control, what should the results of this control look like, who are these civilians, what are
the different levels and groups involved in civilian control of the military and the details of the roles
of the different civilians in the civil governmental and non-governmental institutions are
the starting points in the process of establishing democratic control of the armed forces.
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1. Introduction
This brief essay offers some thoughts on civil-
ian control of the military, what it is that we are inter-
ested in seeing civilians control, and how, and what
we would expect some of the products of civilian con-
trol to be. There is much to be said about this impor-
tant topic, but precious little time to say it, so I have
selected what I consider to be some of the most im-
portant points. When I refer to CCM during my pres-
entation, I mean democratic CCM, as opposed to the
kinds ofCCM we are aware of in communist and other
authoritarian regimes. And because I feel that the term
DCAF more accurately expresses what we're after,
and does not carry the pejorative connotation ofCCM,
I will more often use it.
2. What to Control?
What is it in the military that we want civilians
to control, or perhaps put a different way, what results
are desired from CCM?
• Somewhere close to the top of the list, we do
not want the armed forces to compete politically with
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the democratically elected government, and we do not
want them out war mongering. As we survey the Part-
ner countries, however, there is little threat from these
quarters; I hope you will agree.
• There is also a discussion about who does the
strategic planning, though the more appropriate ques-
tion, perhaps, is who approves it. Given the current
security environment in Europe today, there is the
question of what is involved in strategic planning for
most European nations.
If we exclude those nations with major global
strategic security interests, such as France, UK, Rus-
sia, the US, and excluding peacekeeping and peace
support operations, what are the more "typical" ob-
jectives of a nation's strategic planning?
One is to protect the territory, independence and
assets against external aggression. But in the absence
of clearly defined aggressors, how controversial are
these strategic aims, beyond having affordable and
competent armed forces? And in most nations we find
strategic objectives of providing surveillance of, and
to control, guard, and defend national air space, or to
fulfil obligations of international treaties and agree-
ments. Lower down on the list, we are likely to find
items such as the performance of civil defense tasks
and assisting in disasters.
For most nations in transition, these are not par-
ticularly controversial objectives, thought in many na-
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tions the details have yet to be worked out and ap-
proved.
• Democratic nations want armed forces that
are well led, well trained, adequately equipped, and
which demonstrate an ability to accomplish assigned
missions, and to achieve this state within reasonable
economic constraints. The armed forces leadership
agrees with their civilian counterparts on all of these,
except perhaps the last one. The military will normally
define "reasonable economic constraints" differently
from their civilian leaders if there is a lack of effec-
tive civilian control.
• Additionally, practical civilian focus is on
questions such as,
Is the size and competence of the force ad-
equate, and are reform and restructuring plans realis-
tic and on track?
Is the force capable of providing thorough and
analytical information and data on its needs and re-
quirements to the MOD and from the MOD to parlia-
ments, and is it provided in a timely manner'?
Is the defense establishment effectively man-
aging the 1 or 2 % of the nation's GDP that is its
budget?
Are policies in accordance with the national se-
curity and defense interests and priorities, and are they
being effectively implemented?
And just as the civilians in the MODs are look-
ing at the restructuring of the military education sys-
tem, the parliaments need to be looking at what spe-
cific actions the civilian leadership in the MODs are
taking to develop competence in professional MOD
civilians. We speak of CCM, but it needs to be clear
that control must also be exercised over the 'civilian
leadership in MODs, that they are competent and ef-
fective managers of the armed forces. This is one of
several reasons why I find the term DCAF more ap-
propriate than CCM.
3. The Products of Effective DeAF
At the outset it is important to reaffirm what
we all know, that CMR are characterized by a degree
of disharmony and tension, in even the best of cir-
cumstances, in democratic nations. CCM is manifested
in constitutions, and laws as well as regulations and
policies that grant civilians the authority to create and
enforce laws, provide democratic oversight of the
defense establishment, and place civilians in MODs
from staff officer level to senior decision makers. If
most of the parts are working well, we will see armed
forces that recognize and respect DCAF, and are able
to work effectively, if not in complete harmony, with
their civilian counterparts and leaders.
DCAF provides legitimacy to the military, and
when it works well, credibility. DCAF provides for
armed forces that are accountable, and which conduct
planning in accordance with national security inter-
ests and priorities, and in cooperation with other gov-
ernment agencies involved in national security. Per-
haps more fundamentally, DCAF ensures that the mili-
tary have a clearly defined role in the nation's politi-
callife as individuals, but not as an institution.
DCAF ensures that MODs employ effective
management systems to do such things as:
Determine the appropriate force structure to ac-
complish assigned missions, and provide the force
with adequate resources to do this.
Ensure that the training being conducted in the
armed forces is adequate to produce forces ready and
capable of accomplishing their missions.
Establish and sustain the broad range of per-
sonnel actions from recruiting, fair pay, a merit based
promotion system, health care, quality of life, to equi-
table retirement programs.
Manage MOD and AFs intelligence activities;
a critical area of concern, however, one that our pri-
mary topic precludes me from addressing today.
4. Levels of Civilian Control
The level where civilian and military staff work
together on a daily basis, or should be working to-
gether, I refer to as the operational level of CMR. This
is primarily in the MODs, but there are a number of
civilians working within some of the General Staffs
as well, and in both cases it should be a shared effort,
not a situation where civilian staff officers feel they
can dictate to the military, or where the military feels
there is some benefit to not sharing information with
civilian managers and staff officers.
Even at the operational level of CMR, the ci-
vilian staff brings a balance that should be supported
by a separate career management track, controlled and
managed by civilians, as part of a professional civil
service. I say should be, because there is still a great
deal of work to be done in establishing such career
programs for civil servants in MODs and AFs.
At the senior levels of MODs the decision-mak-
ing is more concentrated in the hands of civilians, en-
suring that the business of the defense establishment
is being conducted in accordance with national secu-
rity and defense interests and priorities, and effectively
managed. Both levels exercise degrees of civilian con-
trol, but in order for them to function adequately, ci-
vilian competence in defense affairs must be devel-
oped, and the military should be educated to under-
stand and accept the role of civilians; and to be in-
volved in defining that role.
Beyond the formal educational requirements for
both military and civilians, the effectiveness ofCCM,
and CMR is hobbled until effective defense planning
and budgeting systems are put into force. More ge-
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nerically, we can refer to these as good defense man-
agement systems, such as formal systems of require-
ments determination, acquisition decision making, re-
quirements based budget systems, as well as fair and
effective personnel management, with merit based pro-
motions, equitable pay and benefits, and down to ef-
fective staff operations where information is shared,
authority and decision making is decentralized, and
where the tradition of over classification of informa-
tion, often to avoid accountability, is changed.
The development and implementation of such
management systems, facilitates both CMR and CCM
within the defense establishment.
5. Oversight: Parliaments,
Ngos, and the Media
At the highest level of DCAF are the parlia-
ments with their oversight responsibility. Oversight is
performed by MPs and staffs that have developed com-
petence in the business of defense and the armed-
forces, and using that competence, require the MOD
to explain and justify requirements. The goal is demo-
cratic accountability. Developing experience and com-
petence in democratic methods of oversight is a long-
term process. Equally clear is the fact that without this
competence, oversight remains sketchy, and account-
ability limited.
Parliaments are by nature, very hectic environ-
ments. In transition countries, the nature of politics
makes it even more hectic, which both facilitates and
circumscribes learning. The details of defense reform
and. budgeting and procurement, with complicated life
cycle cost models, and so much other data, is very
difficult to master. MPs cannot learn most of this from
reading in their spare time. They must be exposed to
the issues and the data, and experts need to be there to
explain these. An adequately sized staff is essential,
not only for individual MPs, but for the committees
as well. The staffs need to become expert in security
and defense issues, in order to provide useful infor-
mation to the MPs and committees. Functional experts
from MODs and GSs will need to come before the
committees to discuss specific items and issues. When
the relationship is starting to function well, prior to
MOD officials coming before parliamentary commit-
tees, MOD or AFs staff members will have discussed
the issues with the appropriate parliamentary commit-
tee staff, and sometimes with the staffs of the indi-
vidual MPs from the committees as well.
It is understood that documents will be provided
by the MODs to the committees. Has the list of docu-
ments required of the MODs been developed in order
to satisfy the most important questions? Are the docu-
ments understandable, and do they provide all of the
information needed, and is this information made
available with sufficient time to study it. A defense
committee chairman once told me that the relation-
ship between his committee and the MODIGS was
excellent, that whenever they were asked to provide
information, they sent it over. But it isn't as easy as
that. Most democratic parliaments can and do look to
expert sources, outside of government, for their input
to security and defense issues. The outside sources
help to formulate questions, as well as what adequate
answers might look like.
Another aspect of parliamentary oversight, and
one that is usually late to develop is recognition of the
responsibility for ensuring the welfare of the armed
forces. Are promotions based on merit? Is the pay sys-
tem fair? Are there decent living conditions and health
care for soldiers and their families? Is good order and
discipline being maintained within the military, and
has brutality been eliminated? Is training being con-
ducted to established standards, and are units exer-
cised adequately in their missions? Moreover, is there
a system of professional development that produces
both civilian and military leaders that understand,
believe in, and support positive answers to questions
like these?
It is essential for MPs and their staff to under-
stand the nature of the missions assigned to the armed
forces by the national leadership, to be able to corre-
late these missions with the budget's required to be
able to execute them. Assigning missions without al-
locating appropriate funding will result in degrada-
tion somewhere. Just as it is necessary for armed forces
and MODs to present to parliaments thorough justifi-
cation and analytical data for their requirements, it is
no less necessary for parliaments to either provide ad-
equate resources for assigned missions, or modify the
missions.
It is also incumbent on parliaments to have
some idea of CMR between and within MODs and
armed forces. And when reform or other key decisions
are stalled in MODs, it is appropriate for MPs to bring
senior MOD and armed forces leadership before ap-
propriate committees to determine what the problems
are and what is being done to resolve them.
Regarding the involvement of civilian experts,
from outside of government, in DCAF, there are 2 brief
points I would like to make. The first and fairly obvi-
ous is that the necessary expertise must be developed.
In most, if not all counties in SEE, this process is
underway, to varying degrees. Second, parliaments
need to look more closely at how to nurture these
sources, and to involve them. Government commis-
sions or committees, utilizing NGOs, academicians
and others may be of considerable value, in develop-
ing competence in national security and defense is-
sues, and in their contribution to public debate on such
Issues.
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Concerning the role of the media, and the rela-
tionship between the media and MODs and AFs, in
those countries where real success has been achieved
we see at least 2 important reasons for this. First,
MODs and AFs have developed a balanced attitude
and approach to public affairs. They have focused on
enhancing the professionalism of their PAdepartments
and personnel, and these departments have taken steps
to develop professional relationships with members
of the media. Second, the media itself has taken a more
disciplined approach to developing competent jour-
nalist with expertise in national security and defense
issues. The combined results are that not only do the
media and defense establishments benefit, particularly
in terms of credibility, but the government and greater
public does as well, in terms of being informed.
How can Western nations better assist? First it
would be useful for countries providing assistance to
research some of the details of the process of over-
sight of security and defense sectors, not from their
own countries, but in the transition countries. A con-
tinuing problem with much assistance is a lack of
knowledge of those providing it, on the current state
of the area being assisted in the host country. Second,
these details should be converted to specific questions
as a basis for discussion. Does the parliament have
multiple sources of reliable information? Are MPs and
staffers aware of the key areas of their oversight re-
sponsibility, and are they addressing specific questions
to the MODs in these areas? Are there illlX-staffers in
the parliaments, or at least some, to assist with the
work we propose? Can both civilian and military offi-
cials from MODs and armed forces be called before
parliamentary committees without major problems?
There are many parts to CCM, and most of them
need to be in place and functioning to some degree of
effectiveness to produce adequate DCAF. We should
also continue to stress that where the military is a
shambles, there is no effective DCAF.
6. Reform Priorities and Future
Developments in See
I have been asked to briefly highlight some of
the key reform priorities in the defense establishments
of the countries participating in this program. It is al-
ways difficult to try to be specific, to say nothing of
accurate, when discussing a grQ!llLof countries, and
as varied as those present today. However, in an effort
to comply with the request of our hosts, I will offer
what I see as 6 high priorities in the reform process,
adding that the priorities are not prioritized.
1. Continued development oflegal, regulatory, and
procedural frameworks that specify roles and respon-
sibilities, and both direct and guide MODs and AFs.
2. The process of reorganization and restructur-
ing in MODs and AFs.
3. Force reductions and force modernization and
readiness.
4. Developing and putting into place democratic
systems (transparent and accountable) of defense man-
agement and planning.
5. Participating in PiP and joining NATO.
.6 Developing and implementing civilian and mili-
tary education systems and career programs conso-
nant with democratic systems.
The real difficulty for practitioners is not so
much in identifying the priorities, but in dealing with
the myriad of challenges and obstacles faced in de-
veloping and implementing associated plans that
would achieve the goals of these priorities.
What is accomplished in the future, like the
past, depends on many factors, but key among them
is the status of national economies. Reforms and re-
structuring are expensive, and move only as fast as
budgets allow. There are no defense budget dividends
for nations whose forces are restructuring.
Second, education for civilians and military is
a major element in the foundation upon which change
is accomplished. First, the teachers have to be taught.
As staffs are educated, they gain the tools needed to
develop planning and management systems common
to democratic institutions. And there has to be a will
to implement, and knowledge of how to effectively
manage plans.
And there is an overarching requirement for
broad based and competent oversight systems.
Closing
The process of establishing DCAF has to start
with an understanding of what it is that civilians are
to control, what should the results of this control look
like, who are these civilians, what are the different
levels and groups involved in CCM, the details of the
roles of the different civilians in the MODs, AFs, par-
liaments, NGOs, and the media. What it is, specifi-
cally, that needs to be controlled, how is control exer-
cised, and what "tools" are available or must be de-
veloped to affect this control. Simply put, what does
oversight consist of, and realizing that there is noth-
ing simple about it.
Finally, I would be remiss not to offer praise,
encouragement, and support to our colleagues in this
transition process, for the successes already achieved,
and for their continuing efforts, for they are, as they
say, "in the arena," day after day. •
